KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

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In the first part of this chapter, I summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings. In the second part, I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind and identify some of the themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind.

In a 1964 lecture on Shakespeare, Jorge Luis Borges offers us ‘one possible definition of the work of genius: a book of genius is a book that can be read in a slightly or very different way by each generation’ (Borges 1999: 473). Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason fits this bill. Since its publication, it has been read in a wide variety of often conflicting ways. The same is true of his theoretical writings more generally. Kant’s theoretical philosophy can be read as a contribution to epistemology, to metaphysics, to the philosophy of science – and no doubt to many more philosophical projects, both esoteric and mundane.
The title of this volume might suggest that we mean to add to these readings: Immanuel Kant was, primarily, a philosopher of mind. This is to overstate our intent. For one thing, these disciplinary boundaries are somewhat artificial and many philosophical projects fall under more than one category. Should an exploration into the possibility of a certain sort of judgment count as an exercise in epistemology or the philosophy of mind? Indeed – as some Oxford philosophers have been heard to say – if knowing is a mental state, isn’t all epistemology a branch of the philosophy of mind? Given the permeability of philosophical boundaries, much work in theoretical philosophy may be as much a contribution to the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and so on, as to epistemology and metaphysics.

Nevertheless, it is true that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is often most straightforwardly classed as a work of epistemology and metaphysics. Kant tells us, in the Introduction to that work, that his project can be summarised in the question: how are synthetic judgments a priori possible? (B19). This raises issues in epistemology about our claim to know a certain class of statements. In answering his question, Kant provides both an account of the sources and limits of our knowledge and an account of how reality must be structured in order to vouchsafe this knowledge. This is a contribution to metaphysics. Since one of Kant’s reasons for asking this question is to articulate the conditions under which scientific knowledge is possible, the work forms the basis for a philosophy of science. And, ultimately, through securing the compatibility of the scientific world-view with human freedom, it provides the basis for an explanation of the possibility of ethics itself.

But Kant’s answer to his question about the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements turns on the role that our mental faculties play in cognition. And this means that lying behind the account of knowledge and reality is a complex and influential account of our mental faculties, their role in representation, their logical and transcendental structure and their expression in thought and action. The essays in this volume concern these aspects of Kant’s Critical views. They treat him, as our title has it, as engaged in the philosophy of mind.
This chapter serves as an anchor to the essays that follow. In Part 1 I summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s critical writings in a way which is intended to be accessible for those without a background in the material. In Part 2 I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition. I have attempted, so far as is possible, to stay reasonably neutral on issues of controversy but, given the nature of philosophical debate, some of the claims which follow will be open to dispute. Nevertheless, I hope these won’t prevent the chapter from serving as a background to the issues which arise elsewhere in this collection.

I. Kant and the Mind

There are many aspects to Kant’s discussion of the mind in his theoretical philosophy. The two most prominent are his account of the cognitive subject and his attack on the rational psychologist’s conception of the self. The first of these is central to the story Kant tells about the source and limits of our knowledge. It is because our minds are structured in a certain way that an explanation can be provided of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. This provides us with an account of the thinking, perceiving agent. The second takes place in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason and consists of a battery of criticisms against the rational psychologist conception of the self as a simple, substantial unity persisting through time. Together, they constitute a sophisticated and distinctive account of the self which stands opposed to the empiricist and rationalist accounts of the mind which preceded it.

But Kant’s discussions in the philosophy of mind extend far beyond this account of the self, as sophisticated and original as it is. Other topics discussed include the spatial and temporal nature of perceptual representation, the structural differences between perceptual and conceptual representations, the involvement of the will in judgement and belief, the relation of cognition to feeling and desire, and many others. Each of these addresses an issue about our mentality, its place in our cognitive life, and its place in the world. Furthermore, Kant’s ethical philosophy is founded on an account of human action and its relation to
the causal structure of the empirical world. Contemporary philosophy of mind places the philosophy of action squarely within its remit and this account of how humans act is an account of how our mental faculties are expressed in the empirical world. The practical philosophy also, then, connects to issues concerning our mentality.

The Cognitive Subject

The centrepiece of Kant’s account of the human mind is his division of the cognitive mind into two distinct faculties: a passive faculty of sensibility and an active faculty of the understanding (A50/B74). Sensibility, the receptive faculty, is a capacity to receive representations through being affected in some way (A51/B75); the understanding is a spontaneous faculty which brings forth its own representations (A51/B75).1 This division seemed to Kant to be a genuine innovation. It first appears in his 1770 *Inaugural Dissertation*, and when he says, in a handwritten note, that ‘the year [17]69 gave me a great light’ (R 18:69), he is likely referring to his recognition of the distinction between the sensibility and the understanding which preceded that work. In the first *Critique* he explicitly accuses his predecessors – he mentions Locke and Leibniz by name – of misconstruing the distinction between sensibility and the understanding (A271/B327). For they mistook a difference in kind for a difference in degree.

Two aspects of this division are important. First, that each faculty cannot be reduced to the other. This is evidenced in the fact that each faculty has its own representations by means of which it relates to objects: ‘Objects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions; but they are thought through the understanding, and from it

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1 I focus here on the cognitive aspect of the human mind. See below for discussion of the faculties of feeling and desire. I use the term ‘the understanding’ in its broad sense, to pick out the higher faculty of cognition in general (as Kant does at, e.g. *ML*, 28:240). Kant further distinguishes the understanding into different aspects: reason, the understanding ‘in the strict sense’ (*ML*, 28:241) and judgement. Reason deals with a priori concepts whose objects need not be met with in experience, whilst the understanding in the strict sense deals only with what is or can be given in sensibility. The faculty of judgement, the capacity to subsume under rules (A132/B171), is treated briefly in the *Critique of Pure Reason* but takes centre-stage in the *Critique of the Power of Judgement*. 

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arise concepts’ (A19/B33). Intuitions are immediate and particular representations through which objects are given to us (A19/B33, A68/B93; JL 9:91). Concepts are mediate, general representations which relate us to objects by means of marks which can be common to more than one thing (A25/B40, A320/B376, JL 9:58).

Second, that the two faculties are individually necessary and jointly sufficient in finite beings for what Kant calls ‘Erkenntnis’. ‘Erkenntnis’ here is a technical term and though early twentieth-century English translations rendered the term as ‘knowledge’, there has been an increasing recognition in the last few decades that Erkenntnis cannot be identified with knowledge, at least if knowledge is understood as the kind of propositional knowledge which has been the subject of contemporary epistemology (Chignell 2014, Gomes and Stephenson 2016, Schafer forthcoming, Watkins and Willaschek forthcoming). Recent translations prefer the term ‘cognition’, whose use I will follow. In very rough and broad terms, we can think of cognition as involving the mind’s being determinately related to an object – ‘the determinate relation of given representations to an object’ (B137) as Kant puts it – where standing in such a relation to an object is a necessary condition of having propositional knowledge concerning the object.

Kant’s answer to his question about the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements makes use of this division between sensibility and the understanding. He claims that each faculty has an a priori element whose existence explains the possibility of certain forms of synthetic a priori cognition. In the case of sensibility, our sensible representations are all structured by the pure forms of intuition, which are space and time. One way to understand this is as requiring that anything which is given to us through intuition is given to us as either spatially structured (e.g. as having extension and location), or as temporally structured (e.g. as having duration), or perhaps as both. More specifically, space is the form of outer sense and time is the form of inner sense (A19/B33f), where the domain of outer sense is the domain of material, extended bodies, and the domain of inner sense is successive states of mind. The identification of the pure forms of intuition explains the possibility of synthetic, a priori cognition in mathematics.
The a priori element to the understanding consists of a set of a priori concepts – the categories – which comprise the forms of thought. These pure concepts are implicated in all acts of judging and their application to what is given in intuition is a necessary condition for a certain type of cognition (A84/B116f). This raises various problems for Kant, not least that of explaining how a pure concept can be legitimately applied to something given in intuition – but his explanation of how and why the categories can be applied to the objects of intuition is meant to secure our synthetic, a priori cognition of scientific and metaphysical truths.

Sensibility and the understanding are subserved by a faculty of the imagination, a less fundamental faculty of ‘intuition even without the presence of an object. (An 7:153). In the empirical sphere, this sub-faculty has a reproductive function, for example in hallucination and memory. But in its ‘transcendental function’ (A124, cf. B152) it mediates between sensibility and the understanding, playing a role in the production of certain kinds of sensory representations and allowing the understanding to apply concepts to that which is given in sensibility. One primary way in which it plays this role is through synthesis: that ‘action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition’ (A77/B103).

One important question about the relation between sensibility and the understanding is whether the understanding is operative in the generation of intuitions. This is an issue which divides recent commentary on Kant. Kant tells us that ‘[t]he same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding’ (A79/B104-5), and that ‘[a]n object… is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united’ (B137). This has been taken to suggest that the understanding is operative in the generation of intuitions such that what is given to us in intuition is presented in accordance not only with the forms of sensibility but also with the forms of thought (Griffith 2012, Longuenesse 1998, McDowell 1998). But others have worried that any involvement of the understanding in sensibility would blur Kant’s strict division of the faculties (Allais 2009, Hanna 2005).
These issues concern topics in what we might call the metaphysics of mind, issues concerning the nature of the human mind, its features, and its characteristics. Kant’s critical philosophy also makes claims about the epistemology of mind, that is, about the way in which we know about our own mental lives and the role of such knowledge and awareness in our cognition of the world. Most basically, and corresponding to the two faculties of cognition, Kant distinguishes two ways in which we are aware of our own mental states: through inner sense, which is a form of sensibility, and through apperception, a capacity grounded in the spontaneous activity of the understanding. And in the same way that Kant complains that his predecessors failed to recognise the distinction between sensibility and the understanding, so too does he complain that 'systems of psychology treat inner sense as the same as the faculty of apperception' (B153; cf. An 7:142).

Inner sense is the faculty ‘by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state… represented in relations of time’ (A22-3/B37). This is the notion of an internal sense one finds in Locke (1975 [1689]: 2.1.4, 105) and Kant’s use of it in the pre-Critical period treats it as the only form in which rational beings can be aware of themselves (e.g. FS 2:60). The account of apperception is more complicated. Kant distinguishes it from inner sense by use of the distinction between passivity and activity: in inner sense ‘we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected’ (B153), which is to say passively, in terms of what we undergo. But apperception involves an act of spontaneity: the subject is conscious of herself in terms of what she does (An 7:161). And this form of awareness cannot be reduced to or explained in terms of inner sense.

The notion of apperception takes centre stage in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Kant focuses there on what he calls the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’, introduced as the idea that the ‘I think must be able to accompany all my representations’ (B132). The possibility of the I think accompanying all my representations shows that there is a form of consciousness by which we are aware of ourselves as the single subject of all our (conscious) mental states. Kant is clear that this form of consciousness is not inner sense: it is a non-sensory expression of our spontaneous capacities. And it requires, he claims, that my
representations be synthesised or combined (A108/B135) in accordance with the pure concepts of the understanding (A127/B143). The striking result, at least on one reading (Bennett 1966, Strawson 1966, Wolff 1963), is that the kind of self-consciousness involved in recognising oneself as the self-same subject of one’s mental states requires the experience of objects as falling under the pure concepts of the understanding. And this Kant takes to provide part of the justification for our applying these concepts to what is given to us in intuition.

These claims have puzzled and inspired commentators in equal part. They suggest a connection between one form of self-consciousness and our awareness of an objective world. For our part, it is enough to note that Kant identified a distinctive form of awareness of oneself, one which is at least potentially involved in all forms of conscious representation and which is an expression of a subject’s spontaneity.

What kind of knowledge can we gain through exercising these forms of self-awareness and what are the limits of such knowledge? This is the focus of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason section of the first *Critique* (A341/B399f). Kant’s target is rational psychology, of which he numbers Descartes and Mendelssohn as a proponents. Rational psychology claims to found substantive metaphysical knowledge about the self solely on the basis of the “I think”, which is to say, solely on the basis of apperception (A343/B401). In particular, the rational psychologist claims to know that the self is a substance, simple, numerically identical over time, and known independently of possible objects in space solely through consideration of the “I think”. Kant objects that the rational psychologist’s arguments for each of these claims involve an equivocation which renders each argument invalid.

Some themes permeate the discussion. First, the rational psychologist mistakenly moves from considerations about the logical subject to claims about the self as it really is. Second, we have no intuitive awareness of the self as it really is, either in inner sense or in apperception. And third, our cognition of ourselves is no more special or secure than our cognition of things outside us. Some of these claims turn on the distinction between appearances and things as they are in themselves which is the centrepiece
of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Inner sense, for instance, cannot present us with the self as it is in itself because it is a form of sensibility and as a form of sensibility it presents us only with appearances (A278, B153). The case of apperception is more complex. Certainly it does not allow us intuitive awareness of the self as it is in itself – the noumenal self – because apperception is not a form of sensible awareness at all (A107). But whilst many have taken it that our apperceptive awareness of ourselves as purely ‘logical subject[s] of thinking’ (A350) rules out any awareness of the noumenal self (Allison 2004, Ameriks 2000 [1982]: 239, Kitcher 1990: 181-204), some have held it to be compatible with some form of non-intuitive, immediate awareness of one’s noumenal self (Brook 1994: 246-52, Wuerth 2014: 115-186).

The effect of the discussion of the Paralogisms is to append to the discussion of the ways in which we know ourselves in the first part of the Critique an account of the limits of such knowledge. Inner sense allows us knowledge only of how we appear and apperception cannot be used to derive the conclusions about the self proffered by rational psychology. Kant’s account of the source and limits of knowledge includes an account of the source and limits of our knowledge of the self.

To summarise: Kant’s general picture of the cognitive subject is one on which the human cognitive mind has two distinct faculties, each of which has their own a priori element and which together allow cognition of objects. Corresponding to each faculty is a mode of awareness by which subjects come to know about aspects of the mind. This picture undergirds Kant’s explanation of synthetic a priori cognition in mathematics, natural science, and metaphysics. And it sets a limit on the kind of knowledge we can gain about the self.³

Other Issues in the Philosophy of Mind

Alongside this account of the nature of the human mind and its forms of awareness, the theoretical philosophy contains discussion of many other issues in the philosophy of mind. I mention a few in what follows.

*Spatial and Temporal Experience:* we have seen that Kant held that space and time play a privileged role in our sensible awareness of objects as pure forms of sensibility, structuring everything that is given to us in outer and inner sense respectively. This discussion raises a set of issues about the spatial and temporal character of human experience. What role does the perception of space and time play in our perception of outer objects? And what role do our concepts of space and time play in our conception of outer objects as capable of existing independently of us? Issues to do with the first question arise in the Transcendental Aesthetic section of the first *Critique* (A19/B33f). In the first metaphysical exposition of the concept of space, for instance, Kant looks to claim that it is a necessary condition on perceiving an object as spatially related that we perceive it as spatially located (A23-4/B38-9). This spatial location requirement looks plausible, but there are questions about whether it is challenged by empirical discoveries into the psychopathologies of visual perception and about whether Kant is right to think that the status of his claim can be established by a priori methods.⁴

The second question raises issues about our *conceptions* of space and time and their relation to our conception of objects as capable of existing independently of our experience of them. Kant argues in the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection section of the first Critique against the Leibnizian claim that objects are individuated by complete concepts (A260-292/B316-349). Kant’s complaint is that such a view entails the numerical identity of qualitatively identical particulars and thus that we cannot have cognition of such distinct particulars without sensible intuition (A263-4/B319-320). Similar considerations are raised in the *Lectures on Logic* where he denies the existence of a ‘lowest concept’, one

⁴ See (Warren 1998) for a reading of the first metaphysical exposition, and (Schwenkler 2012) for a discussion of some of the relations between Kant’s discussion and contemporary empirical work.
which was completely determined and allowed a subject to refer to an individual (JL 9:97-100). This insistence on intuition for individuation might be thought to entail a special status for space and time in our reference to individuals which exist independently of our awareness of them.\(^5\)

*Concepts and Experience:* I noted above that Kant’s division between sensibility and the understanding raises a range of questions about whether the understanding is constitutively involved in the generation of intuitions. This has prompted a debate in the secondary literature as to whether Kant was a conceptualist or nonconceptualist about perception.\(^6\) This is often phrased as a debate over whether Kant holds that concepts are necessary for perceiving outer particulars. There are various ways in which this characterisation needs finessing. First, Kant distinguishes between intuition [Anschauung] and perception [Wahrnehmung], where the latter is something like an intuition of which one is conscious (Prol. 4:300) and we need be clear that the debate in Kant is a debate about the status of intuitions.\(^7\) Second, it is more helpful to focus on the dependence relations that exist between intuitions and acts of the understanding, rather than on the necessary involvement of concepts in intuiting. Partly this is so as to include in the debate those who think that there are acts of the understanding which don’t involve the exercise of concepts and partly to recognise that modal claims about necessary status are entailed by but don’t entail claims about dependence relations.\(^8\)

Considerations which have been raised in support of the claim that intuitions are constitutively independent of the understanding include Kant’s insistence on the irreducibility of sensibility and the understanding; his account of animal perceptual consciousness; his seeming acknowledgement of the possibility of intuitions offering objects to

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\(^{5}\) The most famous discussion of these issues is in (Evans 1980, Strawson 1959, 1966).

\(^{6}\) See (Allais 2009, Hanna 2005) for statements of nonconceptualism and (Ginsborg 2008, Griffith 2012) for conceptualist replies.

\(^{7}\) See (Grüne 2009, McLear 2014, 2015, Tolley 2013). In this way, the debate about whether Kant is a conceptualist or a nonconceptualist has become detached from the discussion of conceptualism and nonconceptualism in the philosophy of perception literature, unlike, for example, the original discussion in (Hanna 2005).

\(^{8}\) On the former see (Land 2006); on the latter see (Gomes forthcoming). (McLear 2014, 2015) helpfully and accurately characterise the debate in terms of dependence relations.
intuition without the functions of thinking (A90-1/B123). Considerations raised against include the role of synthesis in the generation of intuitions and the nature and structure of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. This discussion has implications for contemporary debates about the involvement of concepts in perceptual experience and our relation to non-concept-using animals.

**Self-Consciousness:** we saw that Kant distinguishes two different ways in which we can be aware of ourselves, through inner sense and through pure apperception. How are we presented to ourselves in these forms of awareness, and what are the epistemic features of each form of awareness? Some have seen in Kant’s discussion the first recognition of the distinction between being conscious of oneself as an object and being conscious of oneself as a subject (e.g. An 7:135), a distinction which features centrally in later German idealism and, later still, in Wittgenstein’s discussion of these issues. Kant clearly rejects the view that in being aware of ourselves as a subject of thought and experience, we are thereby perceptually tracking some substance in which our thoughts and experiences inhere. This leaves open a variety of positions one might take on the nature of the subject of which one is aware in pure apperception, from it being the noumenal self as substance to something purely logical. And one’s view on this issue will have implications for the question of whether this form of awareness brings with it any epistemic security or immunity to error.

**Mind and Matter:** contemporary philosophy of mind often takes the metaphysics of mind to exhaust the philosophy of mind, and even within the metaphysics of mind the focus is almost exclusively on the relation of the mental and the physical. We have seen above that Kant’s discussion of the mind quite properly takes the philosophy of mind to extend well beyond this question. But it does include an account of the relation between mind and matter, as set out most centrally in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Kant’s account rests on his transcendental idealist distinction

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9 See (Allais 2009, Hanna 2005, McLear 2011, 2015) for instances of these arguments in support of nonconceptualism; see (Gomes 2014, Griffith 2012) on the arguments against. (McLear 2014) provides a helpful overview of the debate.

between appearances and things in themselves (A391). If one thinks of both mind and matter as things in themselves, Kant claims, then there is a problem in accounting for their relation, since matter would be composite in itself whilst the soul would be simple. But once we recognise that matter is merely an outer appearance, then there is no obstacle to taking the noumenal substance which grounds the appearance of matter to be of the same kind as the noumenal substance which grounds the mental (A359-60, B427-8).

This claim can be read as recommending humility about the nature of mind and matter, and so preventing foreclosure of mind and body interacting. Or one might take it in a more metaphysically loaded way as identifying a ground for both mind and matter which is itself homogenous and thus capable of grounding interaction (and is also, perhaps, neither mental nor material). Either way, it is clear that Kant took his transcendental idealism to dispose of the problem of mind and matter relations.  

*Assent and Epistemic Grounds:* at the end of the first *Critique*, in the *Canon of Pure Reason*, Kant discusses different species of *Fürwahrhalten* – that is ‘holding-for-true’ or assent. This discussion contains the most straightforward Kantian analogues of topics in contemporary epistemology and it has been the subject of a number of recent studies. It also raises issues that relate to the philosophy of mind. Here are two. First, what is the relation of cognition to assent, and in particular to that species of assent which Kant calls ‘knowledge’ [*Wissen*]? The different forms of assent are marked, in part, by the kind of sufficiency they possess. Kant says in the *Lectures on Logic* that knowledge must be ‘based on a ground of cognition that is objectively as well as subjectively sufficient’ (*JL* 9:70). But he also seems to allow some knowledge which is not based on cognition

11 On this aspect of Kant’s discussion, see (Ameriks 2000 [1982]: ch.3, Powell 1990: ch.5). Colin McGinn defends the position that our cognitive limitations prevent us from understanding how mind and matter relate. See (McGinn 1991: 81-85) for the comparison of his view with Kant, and (Ameriks 2000: 313-319) for discussion of the relation. Thomas Nagel (2000: 443-444) also compares his more modest scepticism with Kant. And more recently, Derk Pereboom’s discussion of the relation between mind and matter (Pereboom 2011) draws on Kant’s views about our ignorance of things in themselves in assessing the prospects for physicalism.

(Chignell 2014: 576-579). Does it follow from these characterisations that cognition and knowledge are different kinds of mental states, and if so, does it follow that cognition and knowledge take different objects?

Second, what role does the will play in the formation and sustenance of assents? Kant raises this question in his Lectures on Logic (JL 9:73), holding both that the will has no direct influence on assent (JL 9:74) but also that we can be blamed for giving approval to false cognitions (BL 24:160) and that when ‘an appearance is given to us, we are still completely free as to how we want to judge things from it’ (Prol. 4:290). Answering this question requires us to think about whether the formation of empirical assent involves the exercise of genuine agency and the ways in which our assent forming procedures are subject to the influence of the will. And it bears on an account of perceptual error since Kant holds that the possibility of perceptual error requires judgement: the senses cannot err because they do not judge at all (A293-4/B350, BL 24:83, JL 9:53, VL 24:825).  

Feeling & Desire: although the first Critique focuses almost exclusively on sensibility and the understanding – which we can group together as comprising the faculty for cognition – Kant also distinguishes a faculty of feeling and a faculty of desire which come to the fore in the second and third critiques (CPrR 5:9n). Kant’s reason for distinguishing these faculties is that he thinks the representations involved in each cannot be reduced to the others: pleasure and displeasure, representations of the faculty of desire, are not types of cognition nor forms of desire (CPJ 5:189, 5:206); and desires are neither cognitions nor feelings (CPrR 5:9n). Although none of these faculties can be reduced to another, the faculty for cognition is fundamental amongst the three because the faculties of feeling and desire depend on the faculty of cognition and not vice versa. Cognition presents us with objects which can give rise to feelings of pleasure and displeasure and correspondingly the desire to acquire or shun the object. The

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13 Recent discussion of these issues include (Chignell 2007b, Cohen 2013, 2014b, Kohl 2015, McLear forthcoming, Stephenson 2011).
interrelation of these faculties is of especial importance in the practical philosophy.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Human Action:} discussions of Kant’s theory of action tend to take place in the context of his practical philosophy, but Kant also has an account of human empirical action, one which draws on his account of the three faculties distinguished above. In broad terms, Kant thinks that all actions are caused by desires, where desires themselves arise from certain feelings of pleasure caused by instances of cognition. The most important part of this story is that it is wholly deterministic: ‘all the actions of a human being are determined in accord with the order of nature… and if we could investigate all the appearances of his power of choice down to their basis, then there would be no human action we could not predict with certainty’ (A549/B577, cf. A554-5/B582-3). There are a range of interesting questions about how this account of human empirical action is to be squared with the more familiar Kantian account of human transcendental freedom. And there are interesting contrasts with contemporary accounts of human action which take it that only one or two forms of representation are required to explain human empirical action, as opposed to Kant’s requirement of the involvement of three irreducibly distinct states.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Empirical Psychology:} continuing on the same theme, Kant’s lectures and published work in anthropology and metaphysics contain significant discussion of empirical psychology more generally. Empirical psychology concerns human beings as they are subject to empirical, causal laws, some of which concern the workings of the human mind. Although Kant holds that knowledge of such laws cannot amount to a proper science in virtue of falling short of strict universality (\textit{MFNS} 4:471), this is nevertheless compatible with our pursuing empirically grounded investigation into the structure and workings of the human mind in its empirical setting. Kant’s discussion includes reflection on: the nature of the five senses, including phenomenological and epistemological reflection on their individuation;

\textsuperscript{14} See (Wuerth 2014: ch.6) for a comprehensive map of these different faculties, their subfaculties, and their interrelations.

\textsuperscript{15} See (Frierson 2005, 2014, McCarty 2009) for discussions of Kant’s empirical account of human action. Christine Korsgaard (2008, 2009) and David Velleman (2000, 2006) each provide accounts of the nature of action which draw on Kant’s discussion.
the structure of the imagination and its role in various forms of human cognition; mental illness, its causes and treatment; the nature of temperament and character; and much else related to the mind.\textsuperscript{16}

This is a small subset of the issues in the philosophy of mind that Kant considers in his writings. And the importance and variety of Kant’s discussions should come as no surprise. At the end of the first \textit{Critique}, Kant writes that the central concerns of humanity can be summarised in three questions: 1) What can I know? 2) What ought I to do? and 3) What may I hope? (A805/B833). In his \textit{Lectures on Logic}, he adds a fourth question which he takes to contain the others: 4) What is man? (\textit{JL} 9:25, cf. \textit{C} 11:429). These writings in the philosophy of mind take on this question of who we are. And the resulting discussion is pursued with the intellectual ferocity and fecundity of thought that characterise Kant’s critical philosophy. Kant’s primary interests may be epistemological, metaphysical and practical, but his intellectual projects involve extended reflection in the philosophy of mind, reflection which takes us to the heart of his philosophical endeavours.

II. Kant and the Mind in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy

I turn now to the reception of Kant’s views on the mind in twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Textbook histories of analytic philosophy often trace its founding back to the rejection of neo-Hegelian idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore in Cambridge at the start of the twentieth-century.\textsuperscript{17} This rejection also involved a self-conscious rejection of Kantian idealism, a rejection which would character the reception of Kant’s writings on the philosophy of mind in twentieth-century analytic philosophy. This section charts some aspects of that reception.\textsuperscript{18}

There are multiple strands in the Cantabrigian rebellion against British idealism but Moore’s move from idealism to realism is particularly

\textsuperscript{16} See (Frierson 2009a, 2009b, 2014) and the essays in (Cohen 2014a).
\textsuperscript{17} See e.g. (Hylton 1990).
\textsuperscript{18} See (Coffa 1991, Hanna 2001) for more general accounts of the reception of Kant’s work in twentieth-century philosophy, and (Gomes forthcoming) for a more specific discussion of Kant and early twentieth-century philosophy of perception.
This transition involved sustained engagement with Kant’s writings. The most perspicuous evidence of this engagement is in the 1897 and 1898 dissertations which Moore submitted for the Trinity College Prize Fellowship examinations, recently published as (Moore 2011). Both dissertations were on the topic of Kant’s ethics, though as Moore notes in his intellectual autobiography (1942: 21), the 1898 dissertation is actually concerned with issues that arise out of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Together they provide an insight into the intellectual development which would lead Moore to his ‘The Nature of Judgement’, published in 1899 and extracted wholesale from the 1898 dissertation. This is the paper that Russell later called the ‘first published account of the new philosophy’ and ‘conclusive proof of philosophical genius’. And it led the way to the full rejection of idealism in Moore’s famous 1903 paper ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, the title of which contains an ironic allusion to Kant.

Moore’s central objection to Kant, developed in different ways against Kant’s ethics, his account of a priori truth, and his views on the perception of objects, is that Kant ‘betray the too psychological standpoint above which he seems never to have risen in treating epistemological questions’ (Moore 2011, 1897 dissertation: 62). This is to say, Moore takes Kant as having confused questions about how we are psychologically conditioned to think, perceive, and will with questions about how things are and how things ought to be. In making these criticisms, Moore reads Kant as holding that the psychological activity of the subject literally constitutes the non-psychological domain in question. And he thus rejects Kant’s account of the mind and its functions in service of the new realism.

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19 Russell himself tends to emphasise the contributions of Moore, both in this period, for instance in the preface to his *The Principles of Mathematics* (‘On fundamental questions of philosophy, my position, in all its chief features, is derived from Mr. G.E. Moore’), and later, as in his autobiography (‘Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps’). (Cartwright 2003) has a nice discussion of the relations between Russell and Moore over this period, including consideration of the question of whether these statements overstate the influence of Moore on Russell.


21 (Baldwin 1990: 7-20) and (Moore 2011: xlvi-lxvii) contain excellent accounts and discussions of Moore’s criticisms of Kant.
Contemporaneous with the Cantabrigian rebellion against British idealism was an Oxonian rebellion led by John Cook Wilson and H.A. Prichard, amongst others. This Oxford Realism also involved a rejection of key British idealist theses, but the rejection was developed in ways which importantly differed from that of Moore and Russell. Oxford Realism faded somewhat from view in the second half of the twentieth-century, but recent scholarship has begun the process of bringing it back into focus, a development which is especially interesting given the Oxford Realist commitment to certain theses – e.g. that knowledge is a mental state; that perceptual experience involves primitive non-representational relations of apprehension – which have re-emerged in recent debates. This Oxonian rejection of idealism was formed explicitly through rejection of Kant’s views, so much so that A.S.L. Farquharson, in his memoir of Cook Wilson, goes as far as to trace the origins of the Oxford Realism back to questions posed by a student during Cook Wilson’s lectures on Kant (Cook Wilson 1926: xix).

The clearest exposition of the Oxford Realist opposition to Kant occurs in H.A. Prichard’s 1909 book *Kant’s Theory of Knowledge*, summed up by one reviewer as ‘not so much a serious study of Kant as a work using Kant as a stalking-horse in an argument for independent philosophical conclusions’ (Walsh 1981: 732). As with Moore, Prichard takes it to follow from Kant’s account of the human cognitive mind that the objects of perception and knowledge are constituted by a subject’s mental activity. This is because knowledge, for Kant, ‘consists in an activity of the mind by which it combines the manifold of sense on certain principles... and by which it thereby gives the manifold relation to an object’ (Prichard 1909: 230). Prichard takes this to entail various idealist claims about the objects which are presented to the mind, and he rejects these claims as incompatible with a straightforward realism about the objects of knowledge and perception. As in Cambridge, Kant’s account of the mind is rejected as incompatible with realism.23

22 Useful accounts of Oxford Realism include (Kalderon and Travis 2013, Marion 2000a, 2000b).
23 Prichard’s reading of Kant is criticised in (Bird 1962: 2-17). See (Gomes forthcoming) for more on the relation between Kant and this aspect of early analytic philosophy. Note
It is not obvious how successful the criticisms of these Cambridge and Oxford realists are, even when viewed on their own terms. But they were very influential in setting the terms by which Kant’s work on the nature of the mind was taken up and responded to in the development of analytic philosophy and their readings would colour reactions to Kant’s account of the mind in the twentieth-century.

There were other ways in which Kant’s views on the nature of the mind passed into twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Kant’s views on the synthetic a priori and mathematics were an important spur to Frege’s work in the development of logic and to the extent that this work involved a consideration of the degree to which mathematics and logic could be undertaken without appeal to the deliverances of sensibility, it thereby involved consideration of Kant’s account of mind. Another notable source, particularly in the United States of America, was C.I. Lewis’s reading of Kant, a reading forged not in the context of British idealism but that of American pragmatism. His 1929 book *Mind and the World-order* exhibits a number of Kantian themes and Lewis’s course on the first *Critique* instructed and influenced a generation of Harvard students.24

Of the many philosophers of mind in the twentieth-century who continued to take inspiration from Kant’s writings, two stand out: P.F. Strawson and Wilfrid Sellars. Both were influenced heavily by Kant’s writings and, more importantly, disseminated that influence throughout analytic philosophy of mind. It was through their work and the work of their students that Kantian ideas remained part of the philosophy of mind.

Strawson’s introduction to Kant arose out of the historical peculiarities of Oxford’s degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics which was structured, in Strawson’s day, such that there were two special subjects

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24 Robert Paul Wolff has a series of lovely descriptions of Lewis’s Kant course in his memoir *A Life in the Academy* (Wolff 2013).
which those who wished to specialise in philosophy were obliged to take: Logic and Kant, the latter to be studied through the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Strawson found ‘a depth, a range, a boldness, and a power unlike anything I had previously encountered’ (Strawson 2003: 8). The influence of Strawson’s engagement with Kant can be seen in his pioneering study in descriptive metaphysics, *Individuals* (1959), a work ‘subtly and in part consciously influenced by [the first *Critique*]’ (Strawson 2003: 8). But it is his ground-breaking and influential commentary on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, *The Bounds of Sense* (1966), which demonstrated the importance of Kantian ideas for contemporary philosophical discussions and, in Hilary Putnam’s words, ‘opened the way to a reception of Kant’s philosophy by analytic philosophers’ (Putnam 1998: 273).

Strawson’s central approach to the first *Critique* is captured by his characteristically elegant title, a title which encodes a three-fold pun. First, it is an echo of a title that Kant considered for the *Critique*. Second and third, it plays on the ambiguity of the word ‘sense’ which can denote both sense-experience and sense-meaning. The title, Strawson tells us in his Preface, thus ‘alludes compendiously to the three main strands in [Kant’s] thought’. First, Kant sets a lower limit on sense, arguing that ‘a certain minimal structure is essential to any conception of experience which we can make truly intelligible to ourselves’ (1966: 11). Second, he sets an upper limit on sense, holding ‘that the attempt to extend beyond the limits of experience the use of structural concepts, or of any other concepts, leads only to claims empty of meaning’. Finally, he does all of this from ‘a point outside [the bounds of sense], a point which, if they are rightly drawn, cannot exist’ (1966: 12). This point outside the bounds of sense is Kant’s metaphysics of transcendental idealism and the ‘imaginary subject of transcendental psychology’ (1966: 32). Strawson’s analytic project is to

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25 In a letter to Marcus Herz from 1771, Kant writes ‘I am therefore now busy on a work which I call “The Bounds of Sensibility and of Reason”’ (C 10:123); he repeats the title in a letter to Herz from 1772, writing of a work ‘which might perhaps have the title, The [Bounds] of Sensibility and Reason’ (C 10:129). Zweig’s translation renders the second title as *The Limits of Sensibility and Reason*, but both titles use the same German term, *Grenzen*.  

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extract what is valuable of the first two strands from what he supposed to be the incoherence of the last.\textsuperscript{26}

Strawson’s crisp prose, philosophical insight and sheer intellectual achievement prompted a resurgence of interest in Kantian claims in theoretical philosophy. Three particular claims stand out. First, that there is a close link between our capacity to think of objective particulars and our capacity to think or perceive in spatiotemporal terms. Second, that there is a link between consciousness and self-consciousness, between our awareness of the objective world and our self-conscious conception of that world as objective. Third, that the limits of sense-experience set the limits on sense-meaning and that this shows the unintelligibility of Cartesian Dualism. These three claims came out of Strawson’s reading of the Aesthetic, the Analytic and the Dialectic respectively and they set the framework for the way in which a group of philosophers, most notably many of Strawson’s students, encountered and debated these issues. In this way, Strawson’s engagement with Kant set the topics and character for one set of issues which achieved prominence in twentieth-century philosophy of mind.\textsuperscript{27}

Sellars’s rich training in philosophy included time spent in Paris, at the University of Michigan and at the University of Buffalo, but one particularly formative period was his degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford where Sellars was a Rhodes Scholar.\textsuperscript{28} This brought Sellars into contact with the Oxford Realists whose ideas

struck me with truly revolutionary force… I can say in all seriousness that twenty years ago I regarded Wilson’s \textit{Statement and Inference} as the philosophical book of the century, and Prichard’s lectures on

\textsuperscript{26}See (Glock 2003) for further discussion of Strawson’s work.

\textsuperscript{27}Some of the philosophers of mind influenced, and in many cases taught, by Strawson include, Gareth Evans, John McDowell, Paul Snowdon, Quassim Cassam, John Campbell. The Kantian background is evident in, for instance, (Cassam 1997, Evans 1980, McDowell 1994), but a more general sense of the Strawsonian character of this part of the philosophy of mind can be seen in the essays collected in (Bermudez et al. 1995, Elan et al. 1993, Roessler et al. 2011).

\textsuperscript{28}Sellars arrived at Oriel College, Oxford in 1934; he completed the PPE degree in 1936 and began work on a DPhil, before leaving to enroll on the Harvard PhD programme in autumn 1937 – just as a 17-year old Strawson began his PPE degree at St John’s College, Oxford.
perception and on moral philosophy... as veritable models of exposition and analysis. I may add that while my philosophical ideas have undergone considerable changes since 1935, I still think that some of the best philosophical thinking of the past hundred years was done by these two men (Wilfrid Sellars 1957: 458).

But Sellars was already developing his own philosophical system and, as he put it, ‘[t]he influence of Kant was to play a decisive role’ (Wilfrid Sellars 1975: 284).

Sellars studied the Critique with H.H. Price, and came to believe that ‘by denying that sense impressions, however indispensable to cognition, were themselves cognitive, Kant made a radical break with all his predecessors, empiricists and rationalists alike. The ‘of-ness’ of sensation simply isn’t the ‘of-ness’ of even the most rudimentary thought’ (Wilfrid Sellars 1975: 285). This Kantian background runs throughout Sellars writings, and is evident in his two most important works, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ (1956) and his John Locke lectures, given at Oxford in 1966 and later published as Science and Metaphysics, with the subtitle Variations on Kantian Themes (1968). Both involve a commitment to the distinction between sense and thought and an investigation into the question of how the former can be brought to bear on the latter. In this, and in many of their details, they are grounded in Kant’s presentation of the problem of the first Critique.

Sellars’s influence on twentieth-century philosophy of mind is a little more circuitous. Although his work was influential amongst his contemporaries, it was the engagement of Richard Rorty, John McDowell, Ruth Millikan, Robert Brandom, and others at the end of the twentieth-century which revitalised interest in Sellars. Many of the ideas which these philosophers take from Sellars were first presented in Sellars as Kantian insights. These include the claims that states of knowing and believing fall within a logical space of reasons; that it is a myth to think that a piece of experiential sense-data can play a normative role; that the content of a concept has an essential connection to that concept’s inferential role. These claims are said to be elucidations of Kant’s thoughts about the nature of judgement, its connection to spontaneity, and his conception of concepts as rules. A further Kantian theme is Sellars’s twist on transcendental idealism which
lines up the distinction between appearances and things in themselves with Sellars’s own famous distinction between the manifest and scientific images of the world. In this way and through the work of these philosophers, Sellars’s reading of Kant influenced one prominent part of contemporary philosophy of mind.29

This influence of Strawson and Sellars can be charted in two different ways. The first is their influence – particularly Strawson’s – on the interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. A number of important studies followed Strawson in attending to the account of the mind set out in Kant’s project, but did so with greater fidelity and sensitivity to Kant’s texts. Three notable examples include Karl Amerik’s *Kant’s Theory of Mind* (2000 [1982]), Patricia Kitcher’s *Kant’s Transcendental Psychology* (1990) and Andrew Brook’s *Kant and the Mind* (1994).

The second is their influence on the philosophy of mind. There developed in the later part of the twentieth-century, a distinctively Kantian take on issues in the contemporary philosophy of mind where this Kantian take was grounded in engagement with Strawson’s and Sellars’s writings. This Kantian approach to the philosophy of mind didn’t and doesn’t consist in any agreed set of theses. It involves rather a shared understanding of the relevant problems and a common tradition of interlocutors who are engaged with in addressing those problems. Nevertheless, it seems to me that there are some very general themes which can be identified. I will mention three: a necessary structure to thought and experience; a link between some forms of consciousness and self-consciousness; the rejection of a Cartesian Self. Some of those I intend to classify may demur from the characterisation but I hope the package of views is recognisable in broad outline.

*A Necessary Structure*: the first is a sympathy towards the claim that there is some necessary structure to our experience and thought about the world. This claim can be cashed out in different ways, depending on whether one focuses on the structure of experience or the structure of thought, and

29 Some of those philosophers of mind influenced by Sellars include Paul Churchland, Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom, Ruth Millikan and John McDowell. See (Brandom 2015, DeVries 2009, Rosenberg 2007) for further discussion.
depending on whether one focuses on the role that space and time play in structuring our experience and thought or whether one focuses on the role played by certain categorial concepts such as those of substance and cause. Focusing first on experience, a number of those influenced by Strawson and Sellars take up the question of whether the perception of space and time is required to perceptually individuate particulars (Campbell 2007, Cassam 2007: 85-128, Schwenkler 2012). This discussion is often grounded in Strawson’s take on this question in the masterful first chapter of *Individuals*, but it bears obvious relations to Kant’s discussion of the pure forms of intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic and his criticism of Leibniz in the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection.

The claim that the perception of space and time play some privileged role in our experience of the world needs distinguishing from the claim that our *concepts* of space and time play some privileged role in our *thinking* about the world (as being mind-independent, say). Strawson doesn’t always make this distinction clear and Tyler Burge has claimed that this illustrates a general failing in Kantian philosophy of mind – thought not, he thinks of *Kant’s* philosophy of mind (Burge 2010: 154-156) – namely that of conflating conditions on our objectively representing the world with the conditions for our representing the world *as* objective (Burge 2010: ch.4). Whether or not Burge is right to think of this as a conflation, it is true that the claims are distinct and that both have featured in contemporary Kantian discussions.

A related claim concerns the question of whether there are a certain set of privileged concepts that we must use in thinking about the world. This idea takes a number of different forms. In Evans, for instance, one finds the claim that our grasp of the world as objective requires our possessing a theory of primitive mechanics underlying the concept of a material object (Evans 1980), a claim which echoes Kant’s thought that the categories collectively constitute the concept of an object in general (A93/B125). In Sellars and Brandom the claim is given metalinguistic form: there are certain non-descriptive concepts which characterise a metalinguistic vocabulary for formulating the rules governing the use of descriptive concepts (Brandom 2015: ch.1, Wilfrid Sellars 1974). This metalinguistic vocabulary sets a categorial structure on our thinking about the world.
Self-Consciousness and Normativity: the conflation Burge finds in the slide between identifying the conditions on representing an objective world and identifying the conditions on representing the world as objective might be thought to be an instance of a more general identification of, if not yet a conflation between, certain forms of conscious state and a subject’s awareness that she is in that conscious state. This suggestive identification takes a number of different forms. Evans holds that ‘nothing that the subject can do, or can imagine, will entitle us to attribute [an objective spatial representation] to him if he cannot make sense of the idea that he might be at one of the points representable within his cognitive map’ (Evans 1982: 163) and McDowell holds that experience must be ‘intelligible to its subject as purporting to be awareness of a feature of objective reality: as a seeming glimpse of the world’ (McDowell 1994: 54).

These claims place a close link between certain forms of consciousness and self-consciousness, and the development of such a link has featured centrally in the recent work of John McDowell and Sebastian Rödl (McDowell 2011, Rödl 2007). It can be seen as an attempt to make sense of Kant’s puzzling claim that the “I think” must be able to accompany all my representations (B132).

Amongst those influenced by Sellars, this thought is sometimes said to follow from a prior commitment to the normativity of thought on the grounds that it is only self-conscious states which provide normative reasons for action and belief. That thinking is ‘fraught with ought’ is a central part of Sellars’s view, captured in his now-famous comment that ‘in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing… we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says’ (Wilfrid Sellars 1956: §36). Sellars saw this commitment as derived from Kant’s views about the spontaneity of thought and the autonomous nature of judging subjects, and many of those influenced by Sellars take this to be the central lesson for a Kant influenced philosophy of mind (Brandom 2002). The claim is much less prominent, perhaps even absent, in the work of Strawson and his students.

The Rejection of a Cartesian Self: a final theme concerns the rejection of the Cartesian Self, a lesson which both Strawson and Sellars took from Kant’s discussion in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. This isn’t a distinctively
Kantian theme, since many in the middle part of the twentieth-century rejected the postulation of an immaterial thinking substance, sometimes for reasons stemming from logical positivism, sometimes for reasons connected to a growing commitment to scientific naturalism. Nevertheless, the Kantian discussions of this topic seem to me to involve two distinctive characteristics. First, the rejection of the Cartesian Self often proceeds on non-empirical grounds: the claim is not that Cartesian Dualism is evidentially unlikely, given certain empirical claims, but that there is some deeper, perhaps conceptual, problem with the view (Wifrid Sellars 1970, Strawson 1974). This seems to me aligned to Kant’s own reasons for rejecting the conclusions of rational psychology, namely that they are not just shown to be empirically false on grounds of not according with the empirical evidence but are rather necessarily false given the account of cognition set out in the first part of the first Critique. Second, there is considerable sympathy for Kant’s diagnosis of why the rational psychologist’s arguments seem so seductive, a diagnosis which turns on a mistaken inference from the structure of first-person thought and experience (Cassam 1989, McDowell 1997, Strawson 1966).

These are some of the themes which seem to me to characterise Kantian approaches to the philosophy of mind. In temperament and position they often stand opposed to a certain kind of reductive naturalism which can dominate debates about the nature of the mental. For both Strawson and Sellars, the importance of Kant’s work on the philosophy of mind is that it offers us an alternative to the various empiricist and Cartesian models of the mind which they took to dominate philosophical discussion. And one reason for the continued engagement with their views is that they took this alternative to either be dissociable from the strange metaphysics of transcendental idealism (Strawson) or made compatible with scientific realism about the external world (Sellars). It thus seemed like the realism of Moore and Russell could be made compatible with Kantian views about the nature of the mind.

This brings us full circle. For one recent theme in Kant discussions has been the question of whether Strawson and Sellars were right to think that Kant’s insights can be sanitised and made independent of his idealism. In Kant studies there has been a resurgence of more metaphysically loaded
interpretations of Kant’s critical project which look close to the kind of reading of Kant objected to by Moore and Prichard.  
And in the contemporary philosophy of mind, some of those most centrally involved in the Strawsonian and Sellarsian projects have seen the completion of the Kantian project as requiring not the realism of Moore and Russell but the revival of the Hegelian idealism which they rejected. This is most evident in the trajectory of John McDowell, whose 1991 John Locke lectures, later published as *Mind and World* (1994), see the convergence of Strawson and Sellars (1994: vii-ix). One of the main aims of that work was ‘to suggest that Kant should still have a central place in our discussion of the way thought bears on reality’ (1994: 3). But it was also conceived ‘as a prolegomenon to a reading of [Hegel’s] *Phenomenology of Spirit*’ (1994: ix), a conception which was borne out in McDowell’s later writing (McDowell 2009) and in some of Robert Brandom’s recent work (Brandom 2002, 2015).

The essays in this volume aim to examine Kant’s writings on the philosophy of mind in order to isolate what is important and distinctive about his views. Our hope is that renewed attention to the strength of Kant’s writings will help us to assess to what extent Strawson and Sellars were right in claiming that a viable account of the mind and mental phenomena can be found in Kant’s texts. Our contributors share the belief that there is great insight in Kant’s writings on the philosophy of mind and that in better understanding Kant’s views, we can work our way to a better understanding of our mind and its place in nature.  

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